Are you being served? How proportional multi-member districts could improve your relationship with government

Notes on a new white paper on constituent service and electoral reform

Over my years of advocating for proportional representation, one question comes up consistently: what happens to constituent service?

The concern is understandable: A shift to multi-member districts means citizens might have five representatives instead of just one! Who would we turn to with a problem? And from the representative's perspective: would I now have five times as many constituents? How could I possibly manage that?

The short answer is that several approaches to constituent service can work effectively under proportional, multi-member districts. In fact, there are multiple ways it might function better than our current system—both for citizens and representatives.

The longer answer is in a new white paper I co-authored with Anne Meeker, the Deputy Director of the POPVOX Foundation and one of the nation’s leading casework experts. Our paper has the SEO-friendly title, “How would constituent services in American multi-member districts work”

You can also listen to a 43-minute discussion Anne and I had about our paper, with Protect Democracy’s Drew Penrose, hosted over at POPVOX’s excellent Substack, Voice/Mail. 

Or, if you prefer the middle path, then keep reading here for my breezy author's commentary on the key insights. It is, after all, the path of least resistance.

Why constituency service matters

Before I started working on this paper with Anne, I had a limited understanding of constituent service and casework. It's one of those invisible topics that receives scant attention in political science scholarship or journalism. Yet it represents the nuts and bolts of running a Congressional office.

This is a real shame. Constituent service is actually incredibly important. It is one of the most significant ways people interact with their representatives. And it serves as a powerful tool representatives can leverage to build public trust and connect with constituents. As we note in the paper:

“In public communications materials and media appearances, members frequently note the  benefits of casework, including:  

■ Demonstrating accountability and responsiveness;  

■ Providing tangible benefits to constituents independent of the legislative process; and  

■ As a low-cost way to reach constituents, especially through word-of-mouth stories from successful casework and earned media covering casework wins.  

Notably, casework can be one of the best examples of “recursive representationˮ in the U.S. today, where membersʼ staff and constituents develop long-term relationships that have the potential to inform legislative and oversight agendas.”

(Note: Throughout this post, I use the terms constituent service and casework somewhat interchangeably, since they effectively mean the same thing - the practice of responding to individual constituent requests for support in troubleshooting a bureaucratic problem.)

Constituent service in single-member districts is the luck of the draw. 

Obviously, before making any change to a system, the first question to ask is how well is it currently working?

So, how well is constituent service working under the current arrangements? The quality varies considerably across offices. Some offices invest substantial resources and energy into constituent services and casework. Others care less. Sometimes, this reflects individual members' priorities. Other times it stems from the quality and availability of staff who do the work and care about it.

Consider some evidence: In a recent book, Representing the Advantaged: How Politicians Reinforce Inequality, political scientist Daniel J. Butler finds that "politicians exhibit favoritism toward some constituents over others" and "politicians are less responsive to constituents who are not from their racial group." As Butler explains,

"…politicians come to office with different information, knowledge, and sets of experiences that make it easier for them to work on issues important to people like them... politicians' personal knowledge allows them to more easily help those most like them. This is exactly the behavior we expect from rational officials: they should work on the issues for which their personal knowledge makes it less costly to do so."

Butler finds that these differences translate into the quality of constituent services. Constituents who are more like the representatives get more attention. 

More broadly, representatives in competitive districts devote more resources to constituent service than representatives in safe districts. This shouldn't be surprising. If your electoral victory is narrow, every vote counts. And if every vote counts, good constituent service might make the difference.

But in a lopsided district, there is no penalty for sloppy or negligent constituent service. And if your one House representative doesn't help you, too bad; that's your one and only House representative.

To be sure, a savvy reader might observe that you're not completely s**t out of luck in this circumstance. You also have two Senators. Indeed! We already have multiple representatives. Some citizens utilize this by reaching out to different offices. For many years, Senators of the same state have figured out how to manage having the same constituents, often by specializing in different types of casework.

A savvy reader might also note that sometimes citizens reach out to other House representatives, even if they don't live in their district. For example, some Hill offices build up a reputation for helping veterans or particular immigrant communities. Technically, they are only supposed to help their own constituents. But as big-hearted public servants, sometimes they make an exception.

As we note in the paper:

caseworkers report that many constituents, if unsatisfied with the assistance one office offered on their behalf, will reach out to a different office. On the whole, casework operations vary widely among individual offices: A lack of centralized training and oversight, coupled with different levels of constituent demand and different member office  priorities, means that some teams are dramatically more equipped and experienced than others.

Here's the point: if you are represented in the House by somebody who does not represent you, does not value casework, or is just checked out, this is not ideal. And since only about 10 percent of House elections are even somewhat competitive, most offices do not have any real incentive to excel in constituent service. Many do. But it's optional.

Perhaps it’s no surprise, then, that 85 percent of Americans say that elected officials “don’t care what people like me think.” This is a problem for our democracy. 

Could multimember districts improve constituent service?

So would multimember districts better serve constituents than our current single-member approach?

Consider a shift to five-member districts with proportional representation through an open-list system. At election time, this immediately expands your options. Rather than selecting from a limited pool of candidates selected only for “electability” (read: older, male, white, wealthy), you'd choose from a more diverse array of parties and individuals. This increases the likelihood of finding representatives whose values and experiences more closely mirror your own.

The evidence across democracies is consistent and compelling: countries using multimember districts consistently elect more demographically diverse representatives across age, gender, ethnicity, and ideology. This diversity matters for constituent service - you're more likely to find a representative who not only shares your perspective but whom you can trust with sensitive casework problems.

Representatives can also specialize. Research by Brian Crisp and Patrick Cunha Silva demonstrates that in multimember systems, representatives often focus on specific constituent needs rather than attempting to be all things to all people. This specialization can lead to more effective problem-solving and advocacy.

There's also a practical resilience benefit. Under our current single-member system, if your representative dies or leaves office mid-term, your district lacks representation until a special election occurs. With multiple representatives serving your district, a single vacancy, while still significant, doesn't leave constituents entirely without advocacy.

The point here is simple: multimember districts offer potential structural advantages for constituent service through increased choice, better representation, specialization opportunities, and improved continuity.

In the paper, we go through four models of how this might work.

The four models we propose are:

1. Members compete for casework  

2. Delegations pool casework services  

3. Parties pool casework services  

4. Congress establishes independent ombuds services

Possibility #1 - Members compete

The first model is simple: members compete to outdo each other by delivering superior constituent service. Because exceptional casework and responsiveness demonstrably builds voter support, all incumbents have a strong incentive to distinguish themselves in this arena to boost re-election prospects.

This dynamic could yield significant positive outcomes. The competitive pressure in multiparty districts would likely improve casework quality nationwide. When constituent service becomes a key differentiator between representatives sharing competitive districts, members naturally intensify efforts to recruit and retain the most skilled caseworkers. This competition strengthens the professional ecosystem for caseworkers, creating more robust career advancement opportunities while ultimately serving constituents more effectively.

Possibility #2  - Delegations pool casework.

It’s also possible delegations might pool casework. 

A little graphic suggests some of the possibilities for pooled casework:

We see benefits to this approach. As we write:

“Notably, joint delegation casework could also address the common concern about casework in a multi-member system — namely, that constituents will be confused about whom to contact when presented with multiple options in both the House and Senate. There may be ancillary benefits as well: For example, a larger casework team could allow for more specialization; better absorb the seasonal rises and falls in casework demand; and present a better chance of forming a legislative coalition to address a structural or systemic issue raised through casework.”

Possibility #3  - Parties pool casework services  

Another option is that parties pool the casework among elected representatives within the party.

As we write:

“Another potential model  would be for the parties themselves to develop shared casework infrastructure to help promote standout casework by incumbents of the same party, increasing the likelihood of all their members getting re-elected. While this shift is technically also possible today, it might still be a  logical outcome of the switch to proportional multi-member districts, as parties could be  increasingly reliant on incumbent membersʼ casework abilities to make them stand out from other incumbent opponents in a more competitive field.”

Possibility #4  - Congress establishes an independent ombuds  

A final possibility is that, “Congress may elect to eliminate casework as an element of congressional activities altogether by establishing a separate, stand-alone body tasked with responding to constituent inquiries, either directly or through referrals from legislative offices.”

While this seems to us the least likely outcome, we believe it would be a good idea worth proposing. As we write:

“Congress has long struggled with internal staff capacity, so moving routine casework out of its purview would reclaim a significant amount of  staff labor. A professionalized casework entity may also be able to provide more consistent and higher-quality services to constituents than member office staff hired with little relevant experience. It would also eliminate the problems of member-shopping, and transferring cases when a member retires or otherwise leaves office. Centralizing casework services into a nonpartisan expert body would also allow for  higher-quality data collection on the types of cases Congress sees, providing a more accurate  and real-time body of information for oversight.”

We recognize, however, that individual members often value casework because it offers a tangible way to help constituents. At minimum, they perceive an electoral advantage in providing effective casework. This creates a significant disincentive for members to relinquish this function to a separate bureaucracy.

Of course, we also need to spend more money on Congress to ensure quality service

In the past, I’ve written and advocated extensively about the need for Congress to invest more in its staffing capacity. After all, Congress sets its own budget. And it is persistently underfunding its own staffing needs. This is a tremendous problem. It leads to high staff turnover, and difficulty retaining talented staff. Outside options, especially in Washington, are much better compensated (either in lobbying, or in the executive branch).

So, if we are going to take constituent service more seriously (as we absolutely should!), we need to make sure we fund congressional capacity. That simply means more resources for offices to hire more caseworkers, and pay them decent salaries. We’ve made some progress here. (I’m particularly proud that New America’s work was cited in a leadership press release calling for increasing staff pay in 2021.) But more work needs to be done. 

At a recent hearing before the House Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee, a wide range of good-government advocates reminded Congress that it still needs to spend more money on itself. It certainly does, especially if offices are going to compete more on constituent service! 

Bottom Line: Proportional Representation can be good for constituent service.

Under proportional multimember districts, casework might operate differently than today's system, but there are compelling reasons to expect it could actually improve service to constituents.

To be sure, having a single representative simplifies who to contact. But consider the limitations: What if your sole representative neglects casework? What if their office lacks adequate resources? What if you have a sensitive issue and distrust your representative? What if you seek a representative who shares your lived experiences and values?

Proportional multimember districts significantly increase your chances of having a representative who genuinely represents you. This connection might even strengthen your relationship with the government overall.

As with all aspects of proportional representation, design choices matter tremendously. The casework models we've proposed represent one set of approaches – others may emerge. 

Indeed, advocacy for proportional representation has progressed beyond "Interesting idea, but that would never happen" to "Interesting idea, let's start working out the details." This transition is crucial.

Looking through a historical lens, as I've written on various occasions (most recently here), political development moves in waves and cycles. As our current constitutional order unravels, we will eventually face an opportunity to construct something new. So now is the moment for working out the details of what that future order should look like.

And once again, if you want the whole paper on “How Would Constituent Services in American Multi-Member Districts Work?” click here.